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Abstract
This  paper assesses the manner in 
which socio-economic rights have been 
incorporated into the constitutions of 
selected countries in the Southern African 
Development Community. This debate 
is particularly important because, in the 
last decade, there have been changes 
or attempted changes to constitutions 
in some member states of this sub-
regional community. However, much of the 
comparative work on socio-economic rights 
in the region predates these changes and 
is therefore, largely, no longer relevant. 
Accordingly, the constitutions of South 
Africa, Zimbabwe, Zambia, Botswana 
and Lesotho are surveyed. It was found 
that the state of socio-economic rights 
in these countries could be divided 
into three categories: those that have 
constitutionalised socio-economic rights, 
those without socio-economic rights in their 
constitutions, and those that have socio-
economic rights as directive principles of 
state policy. To understand the implications 
of these categories, an investigation 
was undertaken into whether a specific 
category undermines the enforcement, and 
subsequently, the realisation of these rights. 
The conclusion is that, if socio-economic 
rights are not entrenched constitutionally, 
it is difficult to realise these rights. While 
other options are available such as trying to 
realise socio-economic rights through the 
interdependence and indivisibility of human 
rights, the success of these approaches 
is very limited. Therefore, the exposition 
now, as it was then, is that states must 
take strides to protect these rights. This 
involves a concomitant responsibility to 
provide an enabling environment, free of 
limitations such as political interference and 
corruption, for the judicial enforcement of 
these rights. Zimbabwe is a clear example 
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of how constitutional changes can facilitate an improved realisation of these rights. It is, however, 
also a cautionary tale, via the Mushoriwa case, of how judges in interpreting socio-economic rights 
should keep in mind the states’ international, regional and sub-regional obligations in promoting 
and protecting these rights, to not reverse the gains of previous judgements. 
Keywords: Socio-economic rights; Constitutionalisation; Regionalism; SADC; Justiciability; 
Enforcement; Realisation; Constitutional changes; Interdependence; Indivisibility.
1 INTRODUCTION 
This paper explores the constitutionalisation of socio-economic rights (SERs) in selected 
Southern African Development Communities (SADC) like South Africa, Zimbabwe, Botswana, 
Lesotho and Zambia and how it has not aided or otherwise, the judicial enforcement of 
these rights. The different options, at a domestic level, for protecting SERs are discussed. 
These are: (1) justiciable SERs, (2) SERs as directive principles of state policy and (3) 
non-constitutionalisation of SERs. It is demonstrated that in South Africa and Zimbabwe where 
SERs have been constitutionalised, they are vigorously protected and judicially enforced. In 
Zambia and Botswana where SERs have not been constitutionalised, the enforcement of these 
rights by the courts is problematic. Where SERs are directive principles of state policy, as in 
Lesotho, no additional benefits in terms of judicial enforcement are discernible. This paper 
does not seek to interrogate all measures of legal protection at a domestic or regional level 
for protecting SERs1 nor does it attempt to unpack international, regional and sub-regional 
human rights instruments in these jurisdictions. However, the discussion will take place against 
this background. 
2 THE SOCIO-ECONOMIC RIGHTS DISCOURSE
Socio-economic rights are a series of rights imposing obligations on a state to deliver basic 
goods and services to citizens.2 They represent a desired set of social outcomes3 in which 
rights holders should not, at any time, lack access to a minimum standard of services such as 
education, housing, healthcare, and subsistence. Socio-economic rights are instrumental in 
ensuring that, via a new social order, a state is able to provide a quality life to all its citizens, 
while ensuring that everyone reaches their full potential.4 Therefore, these rights are inextricably 
connected to political freedom, which is self-evident in most constitutions.5
In spite of the above, there have been lengthy debates around the purpose of constitutional 
SERs. Trilsch argues that the entrenchment of SERs in a constitution protects the rights of 
the marginalised and the socially outcast,6 the driving force being the need to promote 
equality and free previously disadvantaged groups from hunger, poverty, landlessness and 
homelessness.7 Liebenberg provides that SERs are part of an “enabling legal framework for 
redressing the injustices of the past and creating a transformed society”.8 Supporters of the 
constitutionalisation of SERs, argue that it would be illogical to educate people about their 
civil and political rights (CPR) whilst they are exposed to the elements and subjected to social 
exploitation.9
Others again, argue that SERs have no place within a constitution,10 the main reason 
being that the constitutionalisation of SERs is not the central tenet of a successful political 
1 For this analysis, see Moyo “Sub-regional and Constitutional Protection of Socio-economic Rights: SADC: 
Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Namibia and Zimbabwe” 2011 MLJ 75 90. 
2 Davis “Socioeconomic Rights: Do they Deliver the Goods” (2008) 6 International Journal of Constitutional Law 
687.
3 Michelman “Socioeconomic Rights in Constitutional Law: Explaining America Away” (2008) 6 International 
Journal of Constitutional Law 667.
4 Foundation for Human Rights Socio-economic Rights: Progressive Realisation (2016) 16.
5 International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance Social and Economic Rights (2017) 4.
6 Trilsch “What’s the Use of Socio-Economic Rights in a Constitution? Taking a Look at the South African 
Experience” 2009 Verfassung und Recht in Übersee / Law and Politics in Africa, Asia and Latin America 552.
7 Ibid.
8 Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights. Adjudication Under a Transformative Constitution (2010) xxi. 
9 Heyns & Brand “Introduction to Socio-economic Rights in the South African Constitution” (1998) Law, 
Democracy and Development 154.
10 Epstein “Drafting a Constitution: A Friendly Warning to South Africa” (1993) 8 American University Journal of 
International Law and Policy 567 577. 
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society.11 They argue that from a risk management perspective, social protection should be 
the responsibility of the citizen.12 The thinking in this regard is that citizens’ social protection 
should be secured by their participation in the free market. Other arguments have also been 
raised. A good example is the polycentric argument stipulating that courts may not be suitably 
qualified to adjudicate on matters involving the allocation of resources.13 Proponents of this 
argument claim that these are policy issues preserving the separation of power and do not 
concern the court. 14 This is however debatable and Liebenberg, for example, advances 
that SERs should be fully justiciable and that courts should not shy away from their role in 
interpreting the substance of rights.15 
Those in support of this “non-inclusion” movement also suggest that the absence of 
SERs in a constitution does not necessarily alter the realisation of socio-economic demands. 
In this regard, the United States of America (USA) is often cited as a case in point. This is 
because, although SERs are deliberately excluded from the USA Constitution, these rights are 
still largely met by jurisprudence.16 An informal second Bill of Rights (BORs) was adopted by 
former president, Franklin Delano Roosevelt.17 Roosevelt proposed an “economic Declaration 
of Rights” to counter the poverty in the aftermath of the great depression and World War II. 
and. In his speech, he noted that:
. . . We have accepted, so to speak, a second Bill of Rights under which a new basis of security 
and prosperity can be established for all…. I ask the Congress to explore the means for 
implementing this economic bill of rights—for it is definitely the responsibility of the Congress 
to do so. . .18
In his speech he also stipulated the rights to:  A job; adequate wages and decent living conditions; 
medical care; economic insurance during sickness, accident, old age or unemployment; and 
proper education. While these are often cited as the basis of SERs, the courts have however 
rejected them as binding.19 
A middle-of-the-road position is taken by those who believe that SERs should be included 
in a constitution, but only in the capacity as directive principles of state policy.20 A notable 
supporter of this movement is South African Judge Dennis Davis, who, in the South African 
context, argued that socio-economic demands should be included in a BORs only as directive 
principles of state policy.21 His contention was that the inclusion of indeterminate rights in the 
constitution would place judges at the risk of falsely interpreting such rights in a manner not in 
keeping with a social democratic reading of the constitution.22 Accordingly, a state has many 
options to choose from when deciding the nature of SERs within their constitution.
3 SOCIO-ECONOMIC RIGHTS AS JUSTICIABLE RIGHTS
A discussion on SERs in SADC would be incomplete without mentioning SERs in the Constitution 
of the Republic of South Africa Act 108 of 1996 (South African Constitution) because of the 
drastic shift in South African post-apartheid legislation. The South African Constitution contains 
justiciable SERs for all, which was unimaginable under an oppressive, undemocratic apartheid 
regime that sought to segregate and differentiate between white and non-white citizens.23 
11 Barak-Erez & Gross Exploring Social Rights: Between Theory and Practice (2007) 22.
12 Barbosa-Fohrmann “Exploring Social Rights: Between Theory and Practice” 2008 European Journal of 
International Law 1111.
13 Barak-Erez & Gross 22. 
14 Mhango “Between Separation of Powers and Justiciability: Rationalising the Constitutional Court’s Judgement 
in the Gauteng E-tolling Litigation in South Africa” (2017) Law, Democracy and Development 2.
15 Liebenberg 33 – 34. 
16 See Sunstein “Why Does the American Constitution Lack Social and Economic Guarantees?” (2005) Syracuse 
Law Review 1 26.
17 USHistory.org “The Economic Bill of Rights” https://www.ushistory.org/documents/economic_bill_of_rights.
htm (accessed 02-11-2020). 
18 Roosevelt “Message to Congress on the State of the Union” 11 January 1944.
19 See De Shaney v Winnebago Cty Dept. of Social Services 489 U.S. 189 (1989).
20 Liebenberg 13.
21 Davis “The Case Against the Inclusion of Socio-economic Demands in a Bill of Rights Except as Directive 
Principles” 1992 South African Journal on Human Rights 489.
22 Davis 489.
23 McLean Constitutional Deference, Courts and Socio-economic Rights in South Africa (2009) 7. 
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South Africa has become a role model for the enforcement of SERs over the last two decades.24
Chapter 2 of the South African Constitution contains SERs. While no distinction is made 
between civil and political rights (CPRs) and SERs within the BORs, SERs can be identified by 
their distinctive nature – social measures that require the allocation of resources.25 This would 
mean the right to: A healthy environment;26 access to adequate housing and protection against 
arbitrary evictions;27 access to healthcare, food, water and social security;28 basic nutrition; 
shelter; healthcare services and social services for every child;29 education;30 and detention 
that respects human dignity, including the provision at the state’s expense; adequate housing; 
nutrition; reading material; and medical treatment.31 The onus is placed on the state to realise 
these rights progressively.32 In terms of s 36 of the South African Constitution however, these 
rights can be limited only in terms of the law of general application, to the extent of being 
justifiable in an open and democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom, 
taking into account relevant factors.33
South Africa has succeeded in entrenching SERs as justiciable rights to some degree. This 
is often viewed as an impossible task as it requires judges getting involved in the allocation 
of resources – a situation that imposes on the government’s ability to manage public affairs.34 
Since 1997, in the case of Soobramoney v Minister of Health,35 the courts have succeeded 
in developing jurisprudence that gained international interest.36 The case dealt with the 
right to access to healthcare by Mr Soobramoney, who was unemployed and had chronic 
kidney failure. He sought admission to the renal unit of a provincial hospital to receive dialysis 
treatment. S 27(3) of the Constitution provides that no person may be denied emergency 
treatment. However, as Mr Soobramoney’s case did not fall within this category,37 the hospital 
could not be expected to offer medical assistance. In addition, noted correctly that the right 
to healthcare is limited by the availability of resources. 
A second and often cited case is that of Government of the Republic of South Africa v 
Grootboom,38 which dealt with two constitutional provisos, specifically, the right to access 
to adequate housing39 and the right to shelter of children.40 A group of 390 adults and 510 
children had been living in an informal settlement, Wallacedene, in appalling circumstances.41 
To ease their plight, they invaded a nearby piece of land earmarked for low cost housing.42 In 
response, they were evicted and their shacks destroyed, after which they were forced to settle 
in a sports field and community hall.43 They then applied to the High Court seeking an order 
directing all three spheres of government to provide them with temporary shelter or housing 
that is more permanent.44 
The Cape High Court found that although there was a violation of the right to shelter of 
the children under s 28(1)(c) of the Constitution, no such violation had taken place under the 
right to housing.45 In order to enforce the right to shelter of the children, through their parents, 
the court ordered the national and provincial governments as well as the Cape Metropolitan 
Council and the Oostenberg Municipality, to provide them with tents, portable latrines and a 
24 Trilsch 552.
25 See Palmer Judicial Review, Socio-Economic Rights and the Human Rights Act (2007) 1. 
26 Section 24 of the Constitution of South Africa. 
27 Section 26 of the Constitution of South Africa. 
28 Section 27 of the Constitution of South Africa.
29 Section 28(1)(c) – (d) of the Constitution of South Africa.
30 Section 29 of the Constitution of South Africa.
31 Section 35(2)(e) of the Constitution of South Africa. 
32 Section 26(2) of the Constitution of South Africa. 
33 Section 36 of the Constitution of South Africa. 
34 Goldstone “A South African Perspective on Social and Economic Rights” 2006 Human Rights Brief 1. 
35 Soobramoney v Minister of Health (CCT32/97) [1997] ZACC 17.
36 Trilsch 557.
37 Soobramoney v Minister of Health 19.
38 Government of the Republic of South Africa v Grootboom CCT 11/00 ZACC 19. 
39 Section 26 of the Constitution of South Africa. 
40 Section 28(1)(c) of the Constitution of South Africa.
41 Government of the Republic of South Africa v Grootboom 4.
42 Government of the Republic of South Africa v Grootboom 4.
43 Government of the Republic of South Africa v Grootboom 10.
44 Government of the Republic of South Africa v Grootboom 4.
45 Government of the Republic of South Africa v Grootboom 14 – 16.
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regular supply of water. 
On appeal, the Constitutional Court (CC) found that s 26 of the Constitution compels the 
state to devise and implement a coherent, co-ordinated programme to meet housing needs.46 
Furthermore, the programme that had been implemented in the Cape Metro at the time of 
the application fell short of the obligations imposed upon the state by s 26(2) in that it failed 
to provide for any form of relief for those desperately in need of access to housing.47 The state 
was ordered to comply with its s 26(2) obligations by devising, funding, implementing and 
supervising measures to those in desperate need of housing.48 By so doing, the court removed 
any uncertainty with regard to the status of SERs in South Africa.49 The court also demonstrated 
that it was also willing to find creative ways to enforce SERs guaranteed in the Constitution.50
While the cases discussed above are landmark decisions, there have been many others 
since then in which SERs have been confirmed and furthered. As such, SERs jurisprudence in 
South Africa is developing. One example is the case of Fisher v Unlawful Occupiers51 in which 
the court had to deal with a land invasion where 60 000 individuals had established a settlement 
on three neighbouring farms.52 This presented a substantial challenge, as neither the owner 
of the land nor the local council wished to house this community.53 The court reasoned that 
the rationale for this decision was premised in a privileged mindset in which the elite fear that 
shacks housing the poor, will jeopardise an excellent future.54 It would have been preferred 
to have the homes of the previously disadvantaged out of sight, and “erasing” their poverty, 
so to speak.55 It was highlighted that this type of thinking was reflective of pre-democratic 
South Africa where a lack of access to land and a place to stay were instrumental in stripping 
individuals of their dignity.56 This is reflected and was reinforced in legislation such as the Native 
Land Act57 and the Native Development and Trust Land Act.58 Herein, natives were essentially 
allocated eight percent of the land, and later thirteen percent. While these repressive and 
oppressive laws have since been abolished, their legacy lives on.
It is in this context that the court had to make a judgement regarding the rights of the 
applicants in terms of s 25 of the Constitution of South Africa (property clause) and those in s 
26 of the Constitution (the right to access to adequate housing). These rights, in terms of s 38 
of the Constitution are enforceable when any litigant is of the opinion that any right specified 
in the BORs has been violated. The court examined this alleged breach together with the 
relevant Housing Act.59 Section 9(3) of the Act provides that a municipality, may by notice in the 
Provincial Government Gazette, expropriate any land required by it for the purpose of housing 
development, if reasonable terms for the purchase of the land had not been agreed upon with 
the owner. The caveat here is that permission has to be obtained from the relevant Member 
of the Executive Council (MEC) before the notice can be published and that such notice is 
published within six months after permission is granted by the MEC.60
Funding for such expropriation may be obtained from a number of sources. For instance, 
Chapter 13 of the National Housing Code provides that grants may be made to municipalities 
for upgrading entire communities. The same chapter also provides for Housing Assistance in 
Emergency Housing Situations. Paragraph 12.3.4.1 provides for grants to be made available to 
municipalities in emergencies. This must be undertaken by the relevant provincial government 
by means of a transfer payment. However, land for emergency situations must be identified 
46 Government of the Republic of South Africa v Grootboom 95.
47 Government of the Republic of South Africa v Grootboom 95.
48 Government of the Republic of South Africa v Grootboom 96.
49 Pillay “Implementation of Grootbom: Implications for the Enforcement of Socio-economic Rights’ 2002 LDD 
256. 
50 De Vos “Grootboom, The Right of Access to Housing and Substantive Equality as Contextual Fairness” 2001 
SAJHR 259. 
51 Fisher v Unlawful Occupiers (Erf 150, Philippi) (297/2014) [2014] ZAWCHC 32; 2014 (3) SA 291
(WCC).
52 Fisher v Unlawful Occupiers 1. 
53 Fisher v Unlawful Occupiers 1. 
54 Fisher v Unlawful Occupiers 1.
55 Fisher v Unlawful Occupiers 1. 
56 Fisher v Unlawful Occupiers 2.
57 27 of 1913. 
58 18 of 1936. 
59 107 of 1997.
60 Section 9(3)(a) of the Housing Act.
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through Spatial Development Frameworks that supplement Integrated Development Plans.61 
Such land must be suitable, and preference should be given to state-owned land, with privately 
owned land being acquired as a last resort. Where privately owned land is expropriated, 
market related compensation subject to independent valuations, is required, in terms of the 
provisions and procedures of the Expropriation Act.62
Having regard to the social and the legal context demonstrated above, the court concluded 
that the City had acted unreasonably and was in breach of its constitutional duty in terms of 
s 7(2) of the Constitution, as read with ss 25 and 26. Mrs Fischer’s rights in terms of s 25 of 
the Constitution had been violated.63 In order to give effect to this right, the court decided 
to fashion its own appropriate remedy for the breach. Quoting Fose v Minister of Safety and 
Security64 and Nokotyana & Others v Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality & Others,65 the 
court was of the view that an appropriate remedy to this breach would be that good faith 
negotiations should be entered into between the owners of the property and the City. This 
would give effect to the rights of the owners, as set out in s 25 of the Constitution and the rights 
of the occupiers of the land as expressed in s 26 of the Constitution.66 The court displayed 
flexibility and ruled that the amount of compensation on the three properties could be varied 
and that the negotiations regarding the Fisher land had to be concluded within a month, while 
those of the other two properties within two months. 
In Zimbabwe, SERs have been recently entrenched as justiciable rights.67 The Constitution 
of Zimbabwe Amendment Act 20 of 2013 draws largely from the South African Constitution 
regarding SERs.68 The mix of rights protected under this constitution include the right to: 
Education;69 healthcare;70 food and water;71 labour rights;72 and the freedom of profession, 
trade and occupation.73 However, the question is whether these rights have been thus far 
adequately protected by the courts of law in Zimbabwe. 
Perhaps the most widely cited and interesting case with regard to the enforcement of SERs 
in Zimbabwe is that of Mushoriwa v City of Harare,74 concerning an alleged violation of the 
right to water in the City of Harare.75 The claim was that the termination of the applicant’s water 
supply on the basis of a disputed water bill and in the absence of a court order, amounted 
to unlawful self-help.76 In the interim, the applicant sought for a provisional order instructing 
the City of Harare to restore water supply to his property.77 The applicant also applied for 
an interdict prohibiting employees of the respondent from interfering or disrupting his water 
supply without a court order and that the respondents be responsible for the cost of the 
application, should they oppose it.78
The facts in this case were not contested.79 There was a clear violation of the peaceful 
and undisturbed use of water by the applicant. The only matter to be determined was the 
lawfulness of such dispossession, the specific question being whether the respondent was 
entitled to cut off a citizen’s water supply without recourse to the law?80 
In response to this question, the respondent argued that its by-laws, and more specifically, 
S.I 164 of 1913 made provision for unfettered discretion to withdraw water supplies to a citizen 
61 Paragraph 2.3.8 of the National Housing Programme. 
62 63 of 1975. 
63 Fisher v Unlawful Occupiers.
64 1997 (3) SA 786 (CC).
65 [2009] ZACC 33; 2010 (4) BCLR 312 (CC)
66 See Kondo “Judicial Overreach in Protecting the Right to Housing in South Africa? A Review of Fisher v 
Unlawful Occupiers, Erf 150, Philippi” (2018) 19 ESR Review: Economic and Social Rights in South Africa 17.
67 Chapter 4 of the Constitution of Zimbabwe. 
68 Chivuru “Socio-economic Rights in Zimbabwe’s New Constitution” 2014 Strategic Review for Southern Africa 
114.
69 Section 75 of the Constitution of Zimbabwe.
70 Section 76 of the Constitution of Zimbabwe. 
71 Section 77 of the Constitution of Zimbabwe. 
72 Section 65 of the Constitution of Zimbabwe.
73 Section 64 of the Constitution of Zimbabwe.
74 Mushoriwa v City of Harare (HC 4266/13) (2014) ZWHHC 195.
75 Mushoriwa v City of Harare 1. 
76 Mushoriwa v City of Harare 1. 
77 Mushoriwa v City of Harare 1. 
78 Mushoriwa v City of Harare 1.
79 Mushoriwa v City of Harare 1 – 2. 
80 Mushoriwa v City of Harare 3. 
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at will without recourse to the courts of law.81 Section 8 of the by-law reads as follows:
The council may, by giving 24 hours' notice, in writing without paying compensation and 
without prejudicing its rights to obtain payment for water supply to the consumer, discontinue 
supplies to the consumer: 
(a) If he shall have failed to pay any sum which in the opinion of the Council is due under the 
conditions or the water by-law.
The applicant, on the other hand contended that s 8 of S.I 164 of 1913 was inconsistent with 
s 77 of the Constitution as well as s 198 as read with s 69(2)(e) of the third schedule to the 
Urban Councils Act [Chapter 29:15] (the parent Act).82 Section 69(2)(e) was crafted to divest 
the respondent of the seeming unfettered permission in s 198 of the Urban Councils Act.83 
It grants the Council power to cut off supply to a citizen after twenty-four hours’ notice upon 
furnishing proof of failure to pay. There is thus no blanket provision for to the City Council 
to disrupt water supply. Further to the above, in the new Constitution, the right to water is 
enshrined as a fundamental right. Section 77 provides that every person has the right to safe, 
clean and potable water.84 The state must take reasonable legislative and other measures with 
the available resources, to achieve the realisation of this right.85 As a public body, and more 
specifically, an institution of local government, the respondent could not therefore deny water 
to a citizen without just cause.86
The court noted that in any matter where an applicant complained that his rights had been 
violated, the courts were duty-bound to interpret and enforce the law.87 This duty is set out in 
s 162 of the Constitution, which provides the court with judicial authority in protecting human 
rights and the rule of law.88 In exercising its constitutional mandate, the court found that in 
many instances, s 8 of S.I 164 of 1913 was in conflict with both the Constitution and parent Act. 
To begin with, the provision permitted the respondent to arbitrarily deprive citizens of 
their right to water without compensation, which is contrary to the Constitution.89 Section 85 
of the Constitution affords any aggrieved persons compensation in any instance where their 
fundamental rights have been violated. Furthermore, the provision allowed the City Council to 
be a law upon itself as it is granted sole jurisdiction over the dispute without granting citizens 
recourse to the law. This not only violated s 69 of the third schedule to the Act as read with s 
165 (1) (c) of the Constitution, but contradicted the well-established common law principle that 
you cannot be a judge in your own case.90
In concluding the above analysis, the court ruled that the law should serve the interests of 
the public, and accordingly, every citizen’s right to water ought to be observed91 and failure 
to do so was not in the interest of the public.92 While the City had a right to collect its debts, 
it could not realise this objective by using unlawful means93 as no person or legal entity is 
above the law. It was emphasised that an abuse of power harms members of the community.94 
Consequently, the court allowed both the provisional order, pending a response on why the 
final order should not be granted.95
81 Mushoriwa v City of Harare 3. 
82 Mushoriwa v City of Harare 4. 
83 It provides that the Council shall have the power to perform any act which in the opinion of the Council is 
necessary for administering or giving effect to any of its by-laws. 
84 Section 77 of the Constitution of Zimbabwe.
85 Section 77 of the Constitution of Zimbabwe.
86 Mushoriwa v City of Harare 5. 
87 Mushoriwa v City of Harare 5.
88 It states that: “The role of the courts is paramount in safeguarding human rights and freedoms and the rule of 
law”.
89 Mushoriwa v City of Harare 6. 
90 Mushoriwa v City of Harare 6.
91 Mushoriwa v City of Harare 6.
92 Mushoriwa v City of Harare 6.
93 Mushoriwa v City of Harare 6.
94 Mushoriwa v City of Harare 7.
95 Mushoriwa v City of Harare 7.
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This was a landmark judgment on the protection of SERs in Zimbabwe, where the High Court 
adjudicated in a matter where a potential violation of a fundamental right exists.96 Moreover, 
the court took the position that it would not abdicate its constitutional mandate as a result of 
illegal provisions in legislation.97 More importantly, the court protected the newly entrenched 
SERs in the Constitution.98 The judgment will no doubt help to avert the catastrophe of being 
without water.99 This interpretation, according to Hellum et al, is consistent with Zimbabwe’s 
international obligation.100 They contend, in a generous interpretation, that s 77 of the 
Constitution of Zimbabwe requires legal measures to be taken to ensure that those who cannot 
afford to pay must be given access to a minimum essential quantity of water.101 The authors 
however, conceded that the dire economic situations in which municipalities find themselves 
make it difficult to comply with these obligations.102 Moreover, where no clear policy at local 
level exists, there is no incentive for municipalities to comply with such obligations.103
It is not surprising that the City Council was aggrieved by the decision of the High Court and 
lodged an appeal with the Supreme Court in the case of City of Harare v Farai Mushoriwa.104 
Eight reasons for the appeal were raised that, in essence, relate to: (a) the relief granted by the 
court a quo; and (b) the general legality of the appellants’ actions. With regard to the first, the 
City challenged the provisional order on the basis that the requirements for the spoliatory order 
and the interdictory relief were not met.105 Furthermore, it was contended that the interim relief 
had the same effect as the final order. On the second, it was claimed that the City must be 
given the power to make rules to ensure its effective administration. Accordingly, the city acted 
lawfully and was not ultra vires of the enabling Act. As regards the constitutional challenge, it 
was proposed that the right to water is not an absolute right, but one, which could be limited, 
for amongst other reasons, regional and town planning. 
With these issues in mind, the court considered the City’s powers, derived from its by-law 
(S.I 164 of 1913) to disconnect water.106  The court averred that the by-law was fair and that 
disconnection was a last resort after all other avenues had been exhausted.107 Furthermore, 
there was enough leeway for consumers to exercise their rights if aggrieved. This was further 
entrenched by a dispute resolution procedure contained in the by-laws that mentions the 
possible penalty of disconnection.108
An important question is whether the by-laws are ultra vires the enabling act. Regarding this 
matter, the court found that a quo where the by-laws were ultra vires the enabling legislation 
was narrow and uni-linear – although not untenable.109 The rationale behind this was that, from 
the perspective of the Supreme Court, the High court failed to account for numerous well-
established canons of interpretation, which dictate that statutes should be interpreted as a 
whole as opposed to units.110 This entails reading the statute in a purposive manner taking into 
account the objects of the statute.111 
In accordance with such interpretation, the High Court was of the view that s 198(3) of the 
Act was broad enough to allow every urban council the power to take the necessary action 
to implement its by-laws.112 The Third Schedule to the Act provides, inter alia, the measures a 
council may take with regard to its by-laws.113 Specifically, paragraph 69 of the Schedule confers 
upon the council the power to make by-laws for the purpose of regulating and rationing the 
96 See Mavedzenge v Chairperson of the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission HC 4014/14 7 – 8. 
97 Mavedzenge v Chairperson of the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission 8.
98 Kondo “Socio-economic Rights in Zimbabwe: Trends and Emerging Jurisprudence” 2017 AHRLJ 31. 
99 See Couzens “Avoiding Mazibuko: Water Security and Constitutional Rights in Southern African Case Law” 
1180.
100 Hellum et al (eds) Water is Life: Womens’ Human Rights in National and Local Water Governance in Southern 
and Eastern Africa (2012) 343. 
101 Hellum et al 343.
102 Hellum et al 343.
103 Hellum et al 343.
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distribution and supply of water.114 Therefore, a view was adopted that s 168(3) had to be 
read together with paragraph 69 in a manner that promotes the overall objectives of good 
governance and just administration.115
With regard to the possible infringement on the Constitution by the by-laws, the court held 
that there was no violation of s 77 of the Constitution, which provides for the right to water.116 
The court’s reading of s 77 favoured an interpretation that s 77 is only violated when the state 
or a local authority fails to provide any water or an adequate supply.117 Such breach may also 
arise where a water supply may be adequate but not potable.118 Accordingly, the court could 
not comprehend how a consumer with full access to an adequate supply of water could allege 
a violation of this right where they failed to pay for water consumed after receiving due notice 
to settle the account.119
It was further proposed that, even if s 77 of the Constitution was flawed, a thorough 
scrutiny of the by-laws would reveal an evaluation consistent with s 77.120 In the view of the 
court, City Council’s power to disconnect water was a reasonable power and did not in any 
way contradict s 77121 and was justified by the fact that the provision of safe and clean water 
requires significant budgets that could only be achieved if citizens pay for their water.122 It could 
therefore not be argued that the disconnection of water because of non-payment constituted 
a violation of the right to water123 – in fact, it constituted a necessary safeguard for the rights of 
other consumers.124 This view was consistent with s 86(1) of the Constitution which dictates that 
fundamental rights and freedoms must be be exercised reasonably and with due regard for 
the rights and freedoms of others.125 On this basis, the application of the 1913 by-laws could 
not be found to impede the progressive realisation of the right to water.126 The court thus 
ordered the appeal to be partially allowed.127 The provisional order of the court a quo was set 
aside with each party responsible for its own costs. 
The Supreme Court of Appeal’s judgment is polarising because, although rational, there are 
reasons why it could be regarded as problematic. A major concern is that of the interpretations 
afforded by the courts. To begin with, the interpretation that the water by-laws are consistent 
with s 77 of the Constitution and do not impede the progressive realisation of the right to 
water is without merit. Section 44 of the Zimbabwean Constitution stipulates that the state has 
an obligation to respect, protect, promote and fulfil the fundamental rights as set out in the 
Declaration of Rights.128 While these rights are subject to limitations as proposed in s 86 of the 
Zimbabwean Constitution, such limitation has to be reasonable, fair, necessary and justifiable. 
As conceded by the Community Water Alliance, such limitation is not justifiable, as other less 
restrictive means could have been implemented.129 The organisation noted that the issuing of 
summons would be a more palatable measure that could still ensure revenue collection. 
Moreover, this judgment is not consistent with the state’s obligation to provide the minimum 
amount of water in terms of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR).130 
The Draft Guidelines on the Right to Water in Africa, prepared by the African Commission 
on Human and Peoples’ Rights, provide that water disconnections are only permissible for 
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non-payment if a user has access to an alternative source – thus ensuring the right to water.131 
Given Zimbabwe’s economic situation and its history of water-borne diseases, it is mischievous 
of the court to make a finding to the effect that water disconnection without an alternative 
supply is constitutional. 
Apart from this judgement, I have discussed other cases where SERs in Zimbabwe 
have been enforced.132 133 However, it is important to note that a number of areas for the 
improvement and enforceability of these rights exists. Ndhlovu, for example, provides that 
“there are conceptual and practical challenges that arise in the enforcement of these rights, 
such as institutional competency of the courts, constructing appropriate judicial remedies 
for the violations of socio-economic rights, among others”.134 He further argues that, for the 
successful implementation of these rights, the courts must avoid a rigid interpretation. They 
should rather adopt a purposive approach that reflect the founding values of the Constitution 
of Zimbabwe, foreign law, as well as norms in international human rights law. 
4 NON-CONSTITUTIONALISATION OF SOCIO-ECONOMIC RIGHTS
While countries like Zimbabwe and South Africa have chosen to entrench SERs as justiciable 
rights, Zambia chose not to, which is strange, given its numerous phases of constitutional 
development.135 Perhaps the most interesting one was the 2016 Constitutional referendum.136 
The distinguishing feature of this process was that it sought to enhance the Zambian BORs 
and to determine how future amendments should be made.137 The proposed amendment, 
Constitution Amendment Bill 37 of 2016, sought to include SERs as justiciable rights. These 
were captured under the banner Economic, Social and Cultural Rights138 and they include 
the right to: Healthcare services; decent housing; food of acceptable standard; clean and 
safe water; decent sanitation; social protection; education; occupation; employment and 
fair labour practices; and safe, clean and healthy environment.139 These rights, as with most 
constitutional SERs, would be subject to progressive realisation.140 Surprisingly, the referendum 
result on these propositions was non-agreement of such amendments.141 This was ascribed to 
a lack of bi-partisan support for the referendum and inadequate voter education.142 Herein, 
the government failed to explain to the general public the reasons and implications of a 
referendum.
Lumina, for example, believes that the referendum was meant to fail from the onset 
because, in terms of the Referendum Act,143 at least fifty percent of entitled voters had to be 
registered for the referendum to be valid.144 This number of “eligible voters” was impossible 
to establish, given the fact that the previous census had taken place in 2010, six years before 
131 See African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights ‘Guidelines on the Right to Water in Africa’ Draft for 
Comment” http://www.achpr.org/files/news/2018/06/d339/achpr_draft_guidelines_on_the_right_to_water_
in_africa_eng.pdf (accessed 3-04-2019).
132 See Kondo “Socio-economic Rights in Zimbabwe: Trends and Emerging Jurisprudence” 2017 AHRLJ 163 – 
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135 See Constitutionnet “Constitutional history of Zambia” http://constitutionnet.org/country/constitutional-
history-zambia (accessed 10-03-2019).
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10-03-2019).
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10-03-2019).
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the referendum.145 This is especially in light of the fact that out of 3 345 471 ballots, 1 853 559 
were “yes” votes while 753 549 were “no”, testifying to the fact that of those who voted, a 
greater number were in favour of the referendum, had it not been for participation threshold 
technicalities.146
Lumina, further argues that there was a politicisation of the referendum147 by calling it 
alongside general elections, thereby overshadowing it by party politics. However, this is not 
unusual as referendums can be held as either part of a general election or as a stand-alone 
poll but the cost of last-mentioned is prohibitive in Africa.148 It is thus more probable that a 
referendum will be held alongside a general election. Even in more developed countries, this 
is still a preferred option as was illustrated by New Zealand in 2020 when a general election 
and two referendums on the legalisation of the recreational use of cannabis and the End of Life 
Choice Act 2019 took place. Specific evidence of politicisation of an election must be provided 
before such allegations can be made. Evidence from the African Union and European Union 
electoral observers shows that the referendum was negatively affected by boisterous individual 
personalities, rather than policies and manifestos.149 Accordingly, it was recommended that 
future referendums should be separated from political events like national elections.150
A key problem that Masterson identified was that the referendum had not been properly 
structured151 in that it conflated two distinct issues into one. As such, voters had to decide 
on whether to introduce new BORs to the Zambian Constitution as amended in 2016, and 
whether or not to repeal and replace Article 79 of the Zambian Constitution. The danger of 
such an approach is the assumption that a lay person would understand the implications of 
such a conflation. The problem could have been solved by calling two separate referendums 
together with the general election, as was the case in New Zealand. 
The amendment to Zambia’s Constitution in 2016 repealed Part IV of the Constitution 
that contained SERs as directive principles of state policy.152 However, the consequences of 
the failure of the afore-said referendum153 is that it is inconsistent with Zambia’s regional and 
international human rights obligations. As a member of the United Nations (UN) and the 
African Union (AU) Zambia has subsequently ratified or acceded to instruments protecting 
SERs.154 These include, amongst others, the International Covenant on Economic Social and 
Cultural Rights (ICESCR) and the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR).155
It could, however, be argued that Zambia does not make provision for self-executing 
treaties under its domestic law. The implication of this is that the Zambian Constitution does 
not require the inclusion of international law in interpreting the Bill of Rights or any other 
statute.156 Rather, any international treaty requires domestic legislation to be enforceable.157 In 
Attorney General v Clarke,158 it was held that:
[I]n applying and construing our statutes, we can take into account international instruments 
to which Zambia is a signatory. However, these international instruments are only of persuasive 
145 Mangaila “Zambia: Bill of Rights Referendum Unsuccessfull” https://www.aa.com.tr/en/africa/zambia-bill-of-
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value unless they are domesticated in the laws.159
This judgment illustrates that international instruments that are not domesticated have no 
binding effect on the Zambian courts. However, in the case of Legal Resource Foundation v 
Zambia,160 heard by the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, it was decided 
that international treaties that do not form part of domestic law and which may not be directly 
enforced in the local courts, may nonetheless impose obligations on a state party.161 Thus even 
if international instruments are not domesticated, they are still part of the international legal 
framework that ought to influence SER litigation.162 This notwithstanding, the enforcement of 
such extra-territorial decisions remains problematic, accordingly, it is imperative that Zambia 
include SERs within its Constitution. Without this legal protection, the courts in Zambia 
will continue to be unable to enforce SERs and the lacunae in SERs jurisprudence will be 
perpetuated. 
Like Zambia, the Constitution of Botswana, 1996 does not refer to SERs. Further to this, 
Botswana has not signed or ratified the ICESCR and its Optional Protocol. To date, the only key 
instrument on SERs signed by Botswana is a party to the ACHPR, which guarantees SERs. This 
instrument has yet to be ratified and incorporated into domestic law via an Act of Parliament. 
This means that the contents of the ACHPR cannot be enforced as Botswana is a dualist state 
and requires treaties to be domesticated before they are fully enforceable.163 A review of the 
jurisprudence in Botswana reveals that the courts have been unwilling to enforce SERs. A case 
in point is that of Sesana v The Attorney General.164 This case concerns the Central Kgalagadi 
Game Reserve (CKGR), an area of 52 000 square kilometres. The reserve was created to enable 
the indigenous peoples of the Basarwa and the Bakgalagadi to maintain their culture and 
way of living, which was hunting and gathering with additional governmental support services 
such as weekly water deliveries, access to healthcare and the provision of rations to destitute 
people and orphans.165 At a later stage, the government began to encourage the inhabitants 
to relocate to other reserves, and subsequently terminated services to the area over a time-
span of six months. 
The CKGR then filed an application to have the termination of services ruled unlawful and 
unconstitutional on the basis that the applicants had, according to the National Parks and 
Game Reserve Regulations 2000, sought for the services to be reinstated. The court held that 
the applicants had a right to occupy CKGR, but the government had no obligation to reinstate 
services. Accordingly, its actions were neither unlawful nor unconstitutional. The rationale for 
this was found in administrative, rather than in constitutional law. This judgment signalled that 
SERs litigation cannot be based on non-justiciable SERs. 
5 SOCIO-ECONOMIC RIGHTS AS DIRECTIVE PRINCIPLES OF STATE POLICY
Many countries continue to choose SERs to be directive principles of state policy within their 
constitutions. One such example is Lesotho. Chapter III of the Constitution of Lesotho 16 
of 1993 contains the principles of state policy. While the principles do not expressly refer to 
rights, provision is made for SERs such as health,166 education,167 opportunity to work,168 the 
environment,169 economic opportunities170 and cultural activities.171 These provisions are not 
as forceful as the traditional grouping of rights protected under other constitutions or human 
rights instruments. For instance, provision is not made for water or social security. They are 
crafted to form part of a policy that serves as a guide for public authorities in carrying out their 
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functions.172 Thus they cannot be enforced in any court of law and remain subject to the limits 
of economic development and capacity.173 This notwithstanding, public authorities need to 
work towards the full realisation of these rights through legislation or otherwise.174
Because of the nature of SERs in the Lesotho Constitution, judicial enforcement of these 
rights has been challenging. In the case of Baitsokoli v Maseru City Council,175 the High Court 
had to rule on the issue of the “right to life” and the “right to livelihood”. It was contested 
whether the right to life in s 5 of the Constitution of Lesotho includes the right to livelihood.176 
The specifics of the matter related to the eviction of the applicants from the Makhetheng 
area and other areas along Kingsway Street in Maseru where they plied their trade as street 
vendors.177 They claimed that their removal violated s 5 of the Constitution of Lesotho. In 
addition, it was contended that the removal was ultra vires the first respondent’s powers under 
s 9 of the schedule I to Urban Government Act 1983. In the court a quo, it was held that 
the right to life, however expansively and purposively interpreted, could not be construed to 
include the right to livelihood.178 The court found that s 5 of the Constitution of Lesotho does 
not embrace a right to livelihood,179 the rationale being that the right to livelihood proved to 
be a directive principle of state policy in terms of the Constitution while the right to life was 
a justiciable right in the same document.180 The court refused to rely on the Indian case of 
Tellis v Bombay Municipal Corporation181 where the court held in passing that the right to life 
“includes the right to livelihood”.182 It reasoned that the facts were hardly comparable and 
that the constitutions differed materially.183 It also noted that it was not convinced with the 
approach adopted by the Indian court in reaching its conclusion.184 In Motbobi v Director of 
Prisons,185 the court found positive obligations relating to CPRs, in a case involving the living 
conditions of prisoners. The court held that conditions within prison cells were unpalatable, 
ordering the provision of water toilets within ninety days. From these cases, it is obvious that 
where there are compelling interests, the courts in Lesotho may attempt to enforce SERs via 
CPRs, while remaining within the bounds of reason.
6 CONCLUSION
The protection and promotion of SERs remain key issues and challenges for Africa and 
Southern Africa. Of the countries studied above, Zambia and Botswana were found to have no 
reference of SERs in their current constitutions. While Zambia has signed more international 
human rights instruments on SERs, the domestic enforcement of these treaties was low in both 
jurisdictions. As a result, courts in both these countries have been unable to enforce human 
rights. In Lesotho where SERs are provided as directive principles of state policy within the 
Constitution, the courts have been unable to directly rely on these SERs. However, in some 
cases, where it was appropriate to do so, the court indirectly protected SERs through CPRs – 
given that they are interdependent and indivisible. 
The strongest protection of SERs of the surveyed countries is found in South Africa and 
Zimbabwe where SERs are constitutionally protected. Constitutionalising SERs is vital and 
enables a clear and distinct framework in which these rights should operate. It crystallises the 
aspirations of the people while simultaneously placing an obligation on the state to respect 
and promote these rights. The courts are thus motivated to enforce these rights because a 
fundamental legal base exists. The courts of both countries proved to be committed to the 
enforcement of SERs. 
Although Zimbabwean courts demonstrated less resolve in later judgements, the position 
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is still better than that in countries where no constitutional protection exists or where SERs 
are directive principles of state policy. SERs are directive principles of state policy. This paper 
recommends that other SADC countries that are yet to constitutionalise SERs do so in the near 
future as this would assist greatly in the protection of SERs. This would also be in alignment 
with international commitments under various human rights instruments that state parties 
have signed. 
